India’s poll watchdog refuses to identify software used in electoral-roll revision, raising questions about algorithmic accountability and the transparency of voter deletions.
The Blink | Democracy & Governance | October 26, 2026: India’s Election Commission has declined to disclose the name and version of software used to identify errors and anomalies in electoral rolls during the controversial Special Intensive Revision (SIR).
Its justification: commercial confidentiality, trade secrets and intellectual property rights.
The refusal, contained in an October 16 response to a Right to Information application, raises a fundamental question.
If software helps identify potentially problematic voter records, who independently verifies that the system is accurate?
What the Election Commission withheld
The RTI application, filed by Telangana-based activist M.A. Mujeeb Ayyub, sought details of the software and algorithms used to detect discrepancies in voter records.
It also asked whether artificial intelligence, machine learning or automated decision-support systems were involved, and what safeguards existed against genuine voters being wrongly flagged.
The Commission invoked Section 8(1)(d) of the RTI Act to withhold the software’s name and version.
It said no new software had been developed or procured specifically for SIR.
On questions concerning automated flagging and safeguards, the Commission argued that the requests sought clarification rather than information covered by Section 2(f) of the RTI Act.
It also maintained that Electoral Registration Officers (EROs), not software, are the statutory authorities responsible for decisions on voter inclusion and exclusion.
Human decisions can still depend on flawed data
The Commission’s explanation establishes who holds legal responsibility. It does not fully explain how digital systems influence the information placed before those officials.
If software flags a legitimate voter as a duplicate, deceased or otherwise ineligible, what checks prevent that error from influencing the final decision?
Are such flags independently verified? Is there a documented audit trail? Can affected voters challenge the underlying data?
These are questions of electoral accountability, not demands to publish proprietary source code.
An audit without exposing trade secrets
The controversy comes after reports that two election commissioners repeatedly raised concerns about aspects of the SIR process and the Commission’s digital systems.
The Election Commission has maintained that internal differences are part of institutional deliberation and that its systems operate under data-security safeguards.
Following those reports, the Commission also ordered a review of voter-roll software involving an independent technology expert.
That is a relevant step. But the public still needs to know the review’s scope, independence, methodology and findings.
Protecting intellectual property need not prevent a confidential, independent technical audit.
The Commission could disclose software procurement details, error rates, verification procedures and anonymised audit findings without revealing sensitive code or voters’ personal data.
The question democracy cannot avoid
The SIR exercise has triggered political controversy and allegations of wrongful voter exclusions. Those allegations require evidence and independent examination; the RTI refusal alone does not establish manipulation.
But withholding basic technical information risks deepening public distrust.
An election system cannot demand complete transparency from voters while offering limited transparency about the technology used to scrutinise them.
The question is no longer simply which software the Election Commission uses.
It is whether the public can independently verify that the technology protecting India’s electoral rolls is not also capable of wrongly excluding legitimate voters.
